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Abstrat
In this paper we study the properties of a Minority Game with evolution realized by
using geneti rossover to modify xed-length deision-making strategies of agents.
Although the agents in this evolutionary game at selshly by trying to maximize
their own performanes only, it turns out that the whole soiety will eventually be
rewarded optimally. This "Invisible Hand" eet is what Adam Smith over two en-
turies ago expeted to take plae in the ontext of free market mehanism. However,
this behaviour of the soiety of agents is realized only under idealized onditions,
where all agents are utilizing the same eient evolutionary mehanism. If on the
other hand part of the agents are adaptive, but not evolutionary, the system does
not reah optimum performane, whih is also the ase if part of the evolutionary
agents form a uniformly ating "artel".
1 Introdution
In his book of 1776 Adam Smith outlined a mehanism whih he supposed to
desribe the behaviour of eonomi soieties [1℄. He postulated that individu-
als who try to maximize their own gain without ative regard to the soiety's
welfare will eventually reward the soiety most eetively. As the mehanism
how this should atually happen Smith desribed it as an invisible hand of
a benevolent deity administering human happiness by leading individuals to
at in a ertain way. In the modern ontext invisible hand proesses have been
studied as part of Game Theory, a branh of mathematis dealing with pay-
os and strategies, where the interrelationships between the best produtivity
of individual ators and the soiety has been rened by John Nash through
equilibrium onept [2,3,4℄. He indiates that individuals ould only maximize
their own benet by taking other individuals into aount. However, Smith's
assumption about the optimal performane of the soiety through selsh in-
dividuals turns out to be valid in ertain irumstanes. For example this is
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the situation for the Minority Game introdued by Challet and Zhang [5℄, see
also Refs. [6,7,8,9,10,11,12℄.
Minority games are repeated oordination games [2,3℄ where agents use a
number of dierent strategies in order to join one of the two available groups, A
or B, and those who belong to the minority group are rewarded. In the original
MG [5℄ the agents are exposed to P dierent histories and the strategy of an
agent determines the hoie of the group for eah history. Thus, the length
or dimension of a strategy equals P , and the set of all possible 2P strategies
omposes a strategy spae from whih the agents' strategies are randomly
drawn in the beginning of the game. Strategies are umulatively sored based
on orret minority group hoies, and at eah step of the game the hoies of
the agents are determined by their highest-soring strategies. In the following,
we shall refer to this basi Minority Game with the above desribed adaptation
mehanism as BMG, and use the abbreviation MG to refer to the Minority
Game onept in a more general fashion.
Minority games an be viewed as simulating the performanes of ompeting
individuals and the welfare of the soiety they ompose. This kind of meh-
anism ould oarsely speaking be involved in a stok market where investors
share information and make buy-or-sell deisions in order to gain prot. If the
number of sellers of a partiular stok is larger than the number of buyers,
supply exeeds demand and one expets a derease in the stok prie [13℄.
Then the buyers, being in minority, would win due to the low prie levels.
In the opposite ase sellers would win, beause exess demand would inrease
the prie of the stok. In the long run, the prie of the stok eventually settles
down to its equilibrium value, i.e. supply and demand are, on average, lose to
eah other and the publi information has been eiently utilized. In relation
to this the utility or performane of the soiety an be viewed as the number
of ontent individuals. In other words if everybody agrees on the prie, both
the sellers and buyers are ontent. In the framework of MG, this means that
the numbers of buyers and sellers are as lose to eah other as possible and
the game is in one of its pure-strategy Nash equilibria [2,3,14,15,16℄. On the
other hand if the numbers deviate from equilibrium, either one of the groups
is dissatised and thus the overall "happiness" of the soiety dereases.
In these games the long-term system performane is of major interest. It is
measured as the variation of the minority group size around its maximum,
suh that the larger the minority group size at every time step is, the bet-
ter the aggregate system performane is. Usually, the behavior of the system
performane depends on a ontrol parameter z [8℄, whih ombines the dimen-
sion of the strategy spae and the number of players in the game. In the BMG
the best system performane ours at z = zc, whih depends on the number
of the strategies eah agent has [17℄. On the other hand, applying an evolu-
tionary mehanism to the agents' strategies usually hanges the behaviour of
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the game remarkably. Coarsely speaking, the evolutionary mehanisms stud-
ied in the ontext of minority games an be divided into two groups, i.e. to
those mehanisms that are applied to pure strategies and do not expliitly in-
lude probabilities in strategy seletion or deision-making of the agents (e.g.
Ref. [18℄), and those that do so (e.g. Refs. [15,16,19,20℄). A further division
an be made between xed (e.g. Ref. [18℄) and variable-length strategies (e.g.
Ref. [21℄).
Our evolutionary minority game belongs to the pure-strategy lass with xed-
length strategies. However, the main dierene between our game and the
game disussed in Ref. [18℄, belonging also to the same lass, is the geneti-
algorithm-based mehanism by whih the strategies of an agent are modied.
We nd that enhaning the BMG with one-point geneti rossover mehanism
results in the birth of new strategies based on well-performing parent strategies
and leads to behavior resembling Smith's invisible hand. Previously we have
studied the eet of geneti rossover of strategies on the MG performane
[22,23,24℄, and shown that our simple pure-strategy evolutionary mehanism
leads to highly enhaned performane, both at the system as well as at the
individual agent level. Reently Yang et al. [25℄ have reported results of a study
using a geneti-algorithm-based evolutionary mehanism, whih turned out to
be quite similar to those of ours [22,23,24℄. Below we will show that with our
evolutionary mehanism the optimal system performane an be reahed for
a wide range of ontrol parameter values. In ontrast to Ref. [18℄, inreasing
the number of strategies inreases the system performane. Furthermore, the
optimal performane is typially reahed for all possible histories independent
of their order of appearane, as the histories are randomly drawn from a
uniform distribution in order to avoid any repetitive history yles.
This paper is organised suh that rst we introdue our evolutionary minority
game (EMG) model. Then we show simulation results on the system per-
formane and ompare them with the optimal limit as well as with results
of simulations using the BMG. Furthermore, we investigate using the Min-
imum and Maximum Spanning Tree methods whether similarly performing
evolutionary agents form lusters in the sense that they would play similar
strategies, and whether well performing agents' strategies tend to be dierent
from those of the badly performing ones. In addition, we briey disuss the
eet of a fration of the agents forming a uniformly ating group, "artel",
on soiety utility. Finally we draw onlusions.
2 Model
Let us rst briey desribe the BMG, and then disuss the strategy evolution
method we have applied. The BMG [5℄ onsists of (odd) N agents who simul-
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taneously hoose between two options, denoted 1 and −1. After the deisions
of the agents, votes are ounted, and those who belong to the minority group
gain prot. The winning minority is publily announed after every round.
The game is repeated, and at eah round the hoie of an agent is determined
by a omponent of a P -dimensional binary vetor alled the strategy of the
agent. Eah of the P omponents indiates a response orresponding to a par-
tiular history vetor of length M , whih omprises of the minority hoies
during the last M rounds. As there are 2M possible histories, P = 2M [5℄.
In the BMG histories are expliitly determined by the hoies of the agents,
but instead we have deided to draw the histories randomly from a uniform
distribution. The motivation for this was to avoid ourrenes of any yli
patterns of repeating histories, thus pre-empting the agents' possibilities for
history-pattern-based oordination. Furthermore, previous results [22℄ with
deterministi histories show that with our evolutionary mehanism, the game
would nally repeat a single history only. The method of randomly seleting
histories provides a stronger basis to justify the suess of the hosen evolution-
ary mehanism in explaining the observed highly eient system performane.
(For disussion on the eet of using random versus non-random histories, see
e.g. [26,27,28℄). In the BMG eah agent has S randomly hosen strategy ve-
tors si that are sored aording to their umulative suess in prediting the
minority group, with unit sore added for the right hoie and deduted in
the opposite ase. At eah round an agent uses the strategy vetor si with the
highest sore.
We dene the performane of an agent at eah round to be the number of times
it has belonged to the minority minus the number of times it has belonged
to the majority, and then saled into the interval [0, 1]. In order to measure
harateristis of the whole system of agents we dene the soiety utility u(t) ∈
[0, 1] at eah round t to be the number of agents who belong to the minority
group divided by (N − 1)/2 (the maximum size of the minority group). In
the minority game studies a ommon measure to haraterise the model is the
attendane [17℄
a(t) =
N∑
i=1
σi(t), (1)
where σi(t) ∈ {−1, 1} denotes the ation whih the agent i takes at round t.
Thus the attendane gets values a ∈ {−N,−N +2, ..., 1,−1, ..., N−2, N} and
it is related to the soiety utility as
u(t) =
N − |a(t)|
N − 1
. (2)
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If a = 1 or a = −1, the soiety utility is at its maximum u = 1. When a
inreases, the soiety utility u dereases. In the minority game studies it is a
ommon pratie to observe the normalized utuations of attendane
〈
a2
〉
/N =
1
NT
k+T∑
t=k+1
a2(t) (3)
as funtion of the ontrol parameter z = 2M/N , see [8℄. The square of at-
tendane Eq. (1) is averaged over T time-steps and then normalized by the
number of agents. In the BMG with a xed number of strategies S per agent
one an separate three regions in the normalized utuations as z hanges:
for small values of z utuations are large, for intermediate values of z they
reah a minimum, and for large values of z they start to onverge towards the
limit of random deisions, being unity (deisions taken by ipping a oin) [17℄.
Aording to Eq. (2), small normalized utuation values indiate large values
of the soiety utility. If we inrease S in the BMG, normalized utuations
also inrease and thus the soiety utility dereases. As we will see later, the
behaviour is very dierent in our EMG: inreasing S leads to larger soiety
utility values, and separate regions of utuation levels do not exist.
In ontrast to the BMG [5℄, where the strategies remain the same throughout
the game, we utilize an evolutionary mehanism that allows agents to hange
their strategies for better personal gain. This mehanism is as follows: after
every r rounds the agents observe the performanes of their neighbours, and if
they are doing worse than a neighbour, they ross two of their best S strategies
and replae the two worst strategies with the resulting ones. The rossover is
done in a typial geneti algorithm fashion [29,30℄: a rossover point pc ∈ [0, P ],
is randomly seleted, and the hildren inherit pc strategy omponents from
one parent and P − pc from the other. For example, if the parent vetors were
(1 1 1 1) and (−1 − 1 − 1 − 1) and the rossover point pc = 2, the resulting
vetors would be (1 1− 1− 1) and (−1 − 1 1 1).
The rule of when and whih agents will attempt to improve their strategies
an be implemented in many ways. The only aim of determining the rule is
to obtain large enough rate of onvergene in the utuation of attendane
Eq. (1). In these studies we have determined the neighbours by spanning
a sale-free tree whose nodes denote the agents, and whose links determine
the neighbours of an agent. With this approah we get fast onvergene in
utuations of attendane, beause the typial node-to-node distane within
a sale-free network is short, and thus the information on the performane of
"good" agents spreads rapidly. Other possibilities inlude, for example, taking
the worst fration of agents and making them ross, or letting an agent observe
its own performane only, and if it ontinuously dereases, allowing the agent
ross its strategies.
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Figure 1. The evolution of utuations in the EMG during one simulation run,
with the number of agents N = 1069, memory length M = 6, number of strategies
per agent S = 21, rossover period r = 2P , and simulation length C = 1000P ,
where P = 2M . The numbers of minority and majority group members (sellers
and buyers) eventually beome as lose to eah other as possible.
3 Results
In our numerial simulations we have observed that in our EMG the soiety
utility tends to maximize within a wide range of ontrol parameter z = 2M/N
values, provided that agents are given enough strategies at the beginning. In
addition we observed that agents whose performane is lose to eah other
do not form groups in the sense that they would use similar strategies. Also
we investigated the eets of group deision-making as well as endowing only
part of the agents with strategy improvement apability. These results are
explained in detail below.
In what follows, we dene the time sale of the simulation in terms of P
rounds, suh that C = const.×P . The strategy length P is a natural measure
of time, sine on average, it takes P rounds to go through all the omponents
of a partiular strategy, and thus an agent an for eah history get response
to the suess or failure of its hoie. In Figure 1 we show the development
of attendane Eq. (1) during one simulation run. We see that the utuations
start at a high level, but are then rapidly damped towards the minimum,
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indiating that the soiety utility Eq. (2) maximizes. In terms of the trading
analogy this means that the numbers of sellers and buyers beome as lose
to eah other as possible, and thus the prie of the ommodity settles down
to its equilibrium value. In this simulation run we have used M = 6, S =
21, r = 2P and C = 1000P (64000 rounds). The behaviour of our EMG
diers onsiderably from that of the BMG, in whih the utuation level
would remain high beause the ontrol parameter value (z ≈ 0.06) lies within
the low-z-high-utuation region, and beause the number of strategies S is
high [17℄.
In our EMGmodel the evolutionary strategy hanges mean that agents an de-
velop and strive to optimize their strategies with the proven rossover method
[22℄, whereas in the BMG model the agents are restrited to their original
strategies. Aording to Smith, individuals who are striving towards maximiz-
ing personal gain eventually promote the whole soiety most eetively. This
is exatly what happens in our EMG, as the agents do not have any expliit
rules to lead the soiety utility to the maximum. Note, however, that unlike in
the real world, all agents are here equal in their "skills". The eet of diering
agent abilities will be disussed below.
In Figure 1 we gave an example of the evolution of attendane Eq. (1) and
maximization of the soiety utility Eq. (2) (minimization of |a(t)|) in one
partiular realization of the game with xed parameter set. Figure 2 shows
the normalized utuations of attendane Eq. (3) versus the ontrol parameter
z = 2M/N , illustrating how the optimum is reahed, if enough strategies
are given to the agents at the beginning of the game. For eah point on the
urve we have used M = 6, r = 2P and C = 1000P , and averaged over 200
estimates. An estimate for the normalized utuations Eq. (3) is alulated
using the last 1000 simulation rounds. The number of rounds r after whih the
agents hek their neighbours and deide about rossing their strategies is two
whole periods. In this time an agent gets, on the average, two responses for
its ations for every history, and thus has time to learn whih of its strategies
perform better than others.
There are two referene lines in Figure 2: the horizontal dotted line 〈a2〉 /N = 1
and the solid line 〈a2〉 /N = 1/N . The former indiates the level of normal-
ized utuations, if the random deision (oin ipping) strategy is used, and
the latter the minimum value of the normalized utuations (maximum soi-
ety utility). The four series below the random deision strategy line display
normalized utuations for S = 5 (triangles), S = 8 (asterisks), S = 13 (plus-
signs) and S = 21 (irles). All series fall around lines whose slopes ≈ 1 whih
is the same as that of the minimum normalized utuations line. As the num-
ber of strategies inreases, the lines start to onverge towards the minimum
normalized utuation line. This indiates that the soiety utility is maxi-
mized. With S = 21 the level of normalized utuations Eq. (3) is very lose
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Figure 2. Normalized utuations versus the ontrol parameter z = 2M/N for S = 5
(triangles), S = 8 (asterisks), S = 13 (plus-signs), and S = 21 (irles) in our EMG.
For omparison, we plotted also the normalized utuations in the BMG for S = 5
(rosses) and S = 21 (stars). We used M = 6, r = 2P , and C = 1000P , and
averaged over 200 estimates. Inreasing S leads the normalized utuations into the
minimum line.
to its minimum value for all values of the ontrol parameter z. Thus, in our
EMG the soiety utility Eq. (2) inreases, if we inrease the number of strate-
gies per agent S. The reason for this is that larger initial strategy sets allow
more rossover ombinations, among whih the agents an nd good ones with
higher probability. Thus, the strategy set size an be seen as representing the
initial apabilities of agents, and also sets a limit for improvement. If S is too
small, it is possible that ombinations do not inlude those strategies whih
nally lead to the soiety utility maximum.
A remarkable property in the ase of S ≥ 21 is that the normalized utuation
values Eq. (3) are minimized for all simulated z. The result is robust and shows
how eient the utilized evolutionary method is. For omparison, we have also
plotted normalized utuations for the BMG for S = 5 (rosses) and S = 21
(stars). Contrary to our EMG, the normalized utuations inrease, if more
strategies are added to agents' initial strategy sets [17℄. Here we an also
separate the behaviour of normalized utuations in the low, middle and high
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Figure 3. Normalized utuations versus the perentage of evolutionary agents for
z = 0.65 (N = 99, M = 6) (irles), z = 0.31 (N = 205, M = 6) (rosses), z = 0.15
(N = 429, M = 6) (plus-signs), and z = 0.07 (N = 891,M = 6) (asterisks). We used
S = 21, r = 2P , C = 1000P , and averaged over 50 samples. The dashed lines are
parabolas tted to the observations using the minimum square error riterion. The
inset shows paraboli oeients qi as funtion of the ontrol parameter, displaying
power-law derease qi ∝ z
−1
.
value regions of the ontrol parameter z. In our EMG, the S = 5 ase is the
most ineient ompared to the games with higher S in the sense of soiety
utility, but still onsiderably more eient than the BMG for S = 5. In fat
the dierene is huge  of the order of ∼ 100 − 1000  in the low z region.
This dierene is even bigger for higher values of S.
The assumption that agents are potentially equal in their skills is important
for reahing the minimum of normalized utuations. If a fration of agents
is not able to adapt by rossing their strategies, the system utility will not
reah its maximum value. This an be seen in Figure 3 where we studied the
development of normalized utuations Eq. (3) as the perentage of evolu-
tionary agents inreases for N = 99, N = 205, N = 429, and N = 891. We
used M = 6, S = 21, r = 2P , C = 1000P for one sample run, and averaged
over 50 samples. If none of the agents is evolutionary, the level of normalized
utuations is that of the BMG using the same parameters. If all agents are
evolutionary, the normalized utuations Eq. (3) are minimized as in Figure
2. Between these two extremes the normalized utuations derease monoton-
ially as the perentage of evolutionary agents inreases. We found that the
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Figure 4. The minimum spanning tree (left) and maximum spanning tree (right)
of pairwise Hamming distanes between strategies used at the end of simulation.
N = 65, M = 6, S = 21, r = 2P , and C = 3000P . Performanes are observed from
the last 100P rounds.
results are best desribed by paraboli derease (< a2 > /N = q2x
2−q1x+q0)
of utuations as funtion of the fration x of evolutionary agents [see dashed
lines in Figure 3℄. The values of the oeients of parabolas seem to obey a
power-law qi ∝ z
−1
, as indiated by the inset in Figure 3.
Returning to the setting where all agents are evolutionary, we studied whether
agents whose performane is lose to eah other form groups within whih
agents use similar strategies. If suh groups exist, there might be partiular
strategies in the whole strategy spae whih are preferred ompared to others,
and agents who use the same or similar strategies would perform about equally
suessfully. Here we measure the similarity of two strategies k1, and k2 with
the Hamming distane
dk1k2 =
∑
P
i=1 |k1(i)− k2(i)|
P
. (4)
In order to study the formation of groups we have simulated our EMG with
N = 65, M = 6, S = 21, r = 2P , C = 3000P , and observed the perfor-
manes of the agents from the last 100P rounds of the simulation. The large
number of simulation rounds guarantees that agents make a suient number
of rossovers and that the evolution of their strategy pools has more or less
stopped. In our simulations suh a stabilization happens often in C = 1000P
rounds. At the end of the simulation run we take notie of the used strategy of
eah agent and alulate the Hamming distane for all possible strategy pairs
between agents.
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In order to visualize the lustering of either winning or losing strategies we
have used the minimum/maximum spanning tree methods formed by using
pairwise Hamming distanes. The minimum/maximum spanning tree is the
shortest/longest tree graph whih an be spanned between the nodes [31℄. If
some strategy pairs resemble eah other, their Hamming distanes are small,
and thus these distane pairs of the whole Hamming distane matrix with
N(N−1)/2 elements will be extrated for the minimum spanning tree, whereas
in the maximum spanning tree, interonneted strategies are far from eah
other in the strategy spae. In Figure 4 we show the resulting spanning trees 
minimum on the left, maximum on the right  whih are oloured aording to
the performane of an agent, saled into the range of [0, 1] suh that red stands
for the best performing agents while blue for the worst performing agents. A
more oarse-grained division of the performanes of agents is indiated by
three symbols: triangles for the best performing third of the agents, irles for
the worst performing third and squares for the agents whose performane is
in the middle of these two. On one hand, the minimum spanning tree shows
that there is no lear lustering of strategies for similarly performing agents,
beause if suh lusters existed, these would be seen as similarly oloured
lusters of agents. On the other hand, the best-performing agents are typially
onneted to less well performing agents in the maximum spanning tree. This
indiates that the strategies of well performing agents tend to be far from the
strategies of less well performing agents. Furthermore, beause well performing
agents are never onneted to other well performing agents in the maximum
spanning tree, their strategies an not be very far from eah other in the
strategy spae. In addition it is worth mentioning that distribution of the
performanes of agents turned out to be approximatively Gaussian.
So far, we have onsidered the agents in the game as individuals making inde-
pendent deisions. To investigate eets of the presene of a uniformly ating
group, artel, on the outome of the game, we have developed a variation
of our EMG where a ertain fration of agents make a group deision and its
members always obey this deision in their ations. The group deision is done
in suh a way that every round the agents of the artel make tentative mi-
nority group votes aording to their strategies, and then the artel deides
the nal minority group hoie for all its members based on these votes. This
is done taking into aount the minority winsaspet of the game, suh that
the nal group deision is the one for whih the minority of the agents voted.
All agents in the group then at aording to this deision.
In Figure 5 we show the normalized utuations as the size of the uniformly
ating group inreases for N = 891 (asterisks), N = 619 (plus-signs), and
N = 429 (rosses). We used M = 6, S = 21, r = 2P , C = 1000P , and
averaged over 50 samples. For very small group sizes, i.e. 0− 2 perent of the
whole population, the system does not suer from a big loss in the soiety
utility, but as the group size grows, the normalized utuations inrease until
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Figure 5. Normalized utuations versus the group size of uniformly ating agents
for N = 891 (asterisks), N = 619 (plus-signs), and N = 429 (rosses). We used
M = 6, S = 21, r = 2P , and C = 1000P , and averaged over 50 sample runs.
For group sizes over ∼ 21 perent of the whole population the utuations grow
monotonially, as the group size is enlarged, and nally reah N for 100 perent. As
an example, the full range for N = 429 is shown in the inset. However, group sizes
below ∼ 21 show ounter-intuitive behaviour as there are loal maxima and minima
on the urves.
they reah a loal maximum at group size of about ∼ 10 − 13 perent of
the agent population. After this, there is as yet unexplained derease in the
utuation values. As the group size further inreases over ≈ 21 perent, the
utuations begin inreasing monotonially with the group size, and nally
reah N in aordane with the Eq. (3). The inset in Figure 5 shows an
example of this growth in the ase N = 429. The loal peaks and the minima
of the urves are rather ounter-intuitive, as group deisions mean that part
of the agents are fored to vote similarly. Therefore, one ould expet that
the normalized utuations always inrease with the group size. One possible
explanation for the minimum might be that as the group size inreases, while
still remaining below some ertain limit, the group is better able to predit
the minority hoie using statistis provided by its own members.
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4 Conlusions
To summarize, we have presented an evolutionary modiation to the origi-
nal Minority Game model [5℄, where individual agents are apable of learning
from the outomes of their past deisions and hanging their strategies a-
ordingly. This modied game leads to a stable situation where the majority
and minority group sizes beome almost equal for a wide range of simulation
parameters. Typially, this happens for all possible histories, and eah agent's
hoie for eah history orresponds to one of the game's pure-strategy Nash
equilibria. This phenomenon an be seen as an example of self-organization in
a omplex evolutionary system [32,33℄, where the evolution is driven by om-
petition among agents. The optimized state emerges as a result of the selsh
pursuits of individual agents. If the game is viewed as a toy model of market
eonomy, the equal group sizes mean that the amounts of buyers and sellers of
ommodity are idential, whih drives the ommodity prie to its equilibrium
value, and soiety utility to its maximum. This is analogous to the Invisible
Hand -eet predited by Adam Smith, stating that selshly-ating individ-
uals who are not atively onerned with the welfare of the whole soiety still
eventually reward the whole soiety in an optimal way.
In priniple, a similar equilibrium state of minimal utuations ould be
reahed by dividing the agents into two almost equal-sized groups, A and
B. Then, group A's minority hoie would always be 1 (or -1), and group B's
hoie the opposite. Our studies show that this does not happen in the EMG
and thus lear lusters of agents utilizing the same or similar strategies do
not form. This is intuitively quite evident, as using strategies dierent from
those of other agents inreases the probability of being in the minority group.
Hene, the agents' strategies tend to move away from eah other in the strat-
egy spae, rather than onverge. In addition, the strategies of well-performing
agents tend to be far from the strategies of agents with worse performanes.
We have also observed that the optimal outome of the soiety is reahed only
under idealized onditions, where all the agents are equally apable of mod-
ifying their ations  a ondition whih is rarely met in real-world eonomi
systems. If only part of the agents are allowed to evolve their strategies, the
utuations do not reah a minimum. Furthermore, we have found that the
utuations derease quadratially as a funtion of the fration of evolving
agents. As for the homogeneity of the agent population is onerned, we have
also investigated the eet of simulated uniformly ating artels. The ex-
peted result emerges suh that if there is a artel in the soiety its utility is
not maximized, i.e. true prie equilibrium is not reahed. Surprisingly we also
nd that introduing a uniformly ating artel does not lead to steadily in-
reasing amplitude of the utuations as would be expeted if there is a artel
in a game where the agents hose their side randomly. Instead of a steady in-
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rease in utuations we observe a loal minimum when the uniformly ating
artel inludes ∼ 20 perent of the agents, for several system sizes studied.
One possible reason might be that the minima arise from a ombination of
two fators. On one hand, the agents involved in the uniformly ating artel
are able to better estimate the winning side when the artel size beomes large
enough. On the other hand, as the artel size grows, the fration of agents,
whih are free to hoose their ations and thus ounter the eet of the artel
dereases, leading to inreased utuations.
Previously, the existene of minimal utuations in minority games has been
disussed and observed by several authors for systems of agents using prob-
abilisti rules for strategy seletion [14,16,19,34℄. In ontrast, in our model,
the mehanisms for strategy seletion are deterministi and do not inlude
probabilities. In the ase of pure strategies, in Ref. [16℄ the authors show that
minimum utuations an be ahieved if the agents are allowed to remove
their ontribution from the outome of the game. In other words the agents
are allowed to subtrat their hoie from the attendane, Eq. (1), used in de-
termining the hange in their personal utility funtion, ∆ui = −sgn(a− ησi).
However, in our model the strategy sore updating rules are the same as those
in the original BMG [5℄, without any extensions or alterations. Nevertheless,
the state of minimum utuations is typially reahed in our game, due to the
eetiveness of the geneti rossover mehanism.
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